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DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION. By Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 291. $19.95.
Educational policy is simultaneously a subject of great dispute and
of unparalleled significance. More than preparing children to "function in society," education shapes the attitudes and preferences of future citizens. In a democratic society the views of citizens become the
policies of a nation, and for this reason education has the potential to
determine America's political future. Amy Gutmann 1 recognizes this
power and in Democratic Education proposes a theory of education
which distributes educational authority in a manner she believes to be
consistent with democratic government.
Gutmann contends that a comprehensive theory of education is
necessary if citizens are to assess and judge policy options. Rather
than arguing in favor of any particular vision of the morally ideal education, Gutmann attempts to answer the following question: Who

1. Amy Gutmann is an Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University and the author of LIBERAL EQUALITY (1980).
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should make educational policy? She asserts that these policy decisions should be the result of democratic consensus. Educational practices must reconcile the competing claims of parental authority,
responsible citizenship, and individual liberty. She concludes that
political majorities should decide educational policy as long as that
policy is not repressive or discriminatory. Gutmann's theory of education additionally requires that future citizens be taught the skills and
values necessary to democratic processes. Schools must teach these
abilities not only because our society values democratic methods, but
also because future citizens will have to make democratic decisions
about the education of the next generation.
Chapter 1 explains and defends the theory against more traditional
views. Gutmann goes on to consider the implications of her principles
and to refine them by evaluating their practical consequences. She accomplishes this "translation of political principles into practice" (p.
17) through a discussion of the democratic purposes of primary
schooling (ch. 2). Gutmann uses this "groundwork" for consideration
of the dimensions of democratic participation (ch. 3), the limits of
democratic authority (ch. 4), and the distribution of primary schooling
(ch. 5). She then applies democratic principles to higher education
(chs. 6 and 7), educational institutions other than schools (ch. 8), and
adult education (ch. 9). She concludes by showing how democratic
education is consistent with the assertion that politics is a form of education. While Gutmann provides a comprehensive discussion of educational policy, her conclusions are not always consistent with the
democratic theory she advocates. A detailed explanation of her theoretical development and an analysis of her conclusions demonstrate
this weakness.
In chapter 1 Gutmann begins her explication of democratic education by considering three traditional views of the control of education.
She rejects each in tum but takes principles from each which help
forge her democratic theory. She describes these alternatives as the
family state, the state of families, and the state of individuals (p. 22).
The family state seeks to foster a "like-mindedness and camaraderie
among citizens that most of us expect to find only within families" (p.
23). All members are educated to accept the single, "correct" vision
of the good life. 2 State control oyer education is absolute and its aim is
to inculcate in children a desire to pursue the true good life rather
than other inferior alternatives. Gutmann rejects the family state because, even if there is such a thing as the good life (which she doubts)
(pp. 28, 44), parents and citizens have differing conceptions as to what
2. For discussion of the "family state" approach see PLATO, Crito, in THE LAST DAYS OF
SOCRATES (H. Tredennick trans. 1969); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (B. Jowett trans. 1941); B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); B. WILLIAMS, The Truth in Relativism, in MORAL LUCK (1981); K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966).
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constitutes a just society for them and their children. Adult citizens
who have not yet discovered the good life, have a right to try to perpetuate their vision. For this reason they are entitled to a share of educational authority which undermines the state's claim to total control.
The state of families is at the opposite extreme. 3 It places exclusive
responsibility for education in the hands of parents. They may thus
predispose their children to choose a way of life consistent with their
preferences. Gutmann condemns the insulation of children from exposure to different attitudes and preferences. Rather, an education
must develop the ability to choose among competing conceptions of
the good life. Since children are members of both families and the
state, both have a claim to educational authority. 4
While the family state and the state of families justify instruction
that biases children towards some conceptions of the good life, the
state of individuals demands absolute neutrality in the teaching of values. 5 It supposes that all understandings of the good life are valid and
that education should not bias children toward any particular view. 6
Educational authority in the state of individuals should be exercised
exclusively by professional educators who not only must avoid bias,
but also must teach the skills necessary to individual choice among
differing conceptions. Gutmann's criticism of this view of educational
control is that we value education not just for the liberty of choice that
it encourages, but for the virtue that it bestows on children. Society
has an interest in predisposing children to only a select r~nge of
choices that will allow them to flourish and function in a democratic
society. Additionally, she notes that neutrality among virtues is itself
controversial. Indifference among virtues offends supporters of moral
education as much as instruction in only one view of the good life
represses those who favor a different view. 7
3. For discussion of the "state of families," see M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
(1962); J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL
(1978); Schrag, The Right to Educate, 19 SCH. REV. 359 (1971); c. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG
(1978); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Second Treatise) (P. Laslett rev. ed.
1963); N. TARCOV, LoCKE'S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY (1984).
4. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Supreme Court considered the state's interest in having all of its citizens reasonably well educated so that they could
participate in political affairs and become economically self-sufficient. However, that interest
was not sufficient to deny the rights of the Amish to the free exercise of their religion. Thus the
parent's claim to educational authority overrode the state's interests.
5. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980), for a defense of
liberal neutrality.
6. For discussion of the "state of individuals" seeJ.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM,
LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (E.P. Dutton ed. 1951); I. KANT, THE EDU·
CATIONAL THEORY OF IMMANUEL KANT (E.F. Buchner trans. 1904); B. ACKERMAN, supra
note 5.
7. Gutmann has changed her views on this approach to education. At one time she favored
only those educational techniques that maximized the future freedom of children. See Gutmann,
Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980).
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Gutmann finds none of the three traditional views satisfying. The
problem remains: education cannot and should not be morally neutral. How then should society determine which values to teach future
citizens? Gutmann first defines an inclusive ground on which to justify non-neutral education - a commonly held virtue broad enough to
permit differing views of the good life to flourish. That virtue is a
commitment to "conscious social reproduction." She states, "We are
committed to collectively re-creating the society that we share.
Although we are not collectively committed to any particular set of
educational aims, we are committed to arriving at an agreement on
our educational aims .... " (p. 39). Therefore, while education cannot
avoid biases towards some conceptions, differing views of virtue, the
good life, and moral character can coexist within the notion of conscious social reproduction. The principle leaves room for citizens collectively to shape education in their society. Each view may be put
forward in the democratic process, and while those preferred by the
majority will be favored in our schools, no view may be repressed. At
the same time all children must be educated so that they can share in
consciously reproducing their society when they become adults. Future citizens must learn the skills that allow them to represent their
views in the democratic process and the attitudes that make them tolerant of differences as well as democratic outcomes.
Democratic education combines many aspects of the three traditional approaches which Gutmann rejects. Educational authority is
shared by the state, parents and professional educators. Like the family state a democratic state seeks to teach a societal virtue - the democratic virtue of conscious social reproduction, which aims to
predispose children towards those values consistent with the sharing
of rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. Like the state of
families, the democratic state recognizes that parents have an interest
in shaping the education of their children, but only within the limits
set by democracy. Like the state of individuals, a democratic state
favors participation of professional educators in developing choice
among "good lives." But it is the ability to evaluate these choices and
to appreciate moral values common to this society that democracy respects, not the neutrality among all moral views that is the basis of the
state of individuals.
The primary purpose of democratic education is to develop what
Gutmann calls "deliberative" or "democratic" character. Nurturing
democratic character involves two crucial components. First, schools
must teach moral reasoning; second, they must inculcate moral character. Moral reasoning includes thinking critically about authority
and permits future citizens to evaluate competing moral claims and
choose among them. Consequently they can understand their own
preferences and participate in developing social preferences. Moral
character, on the other hand, fosters behavior in accordance with au-
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thority (p. 51). Society has an interest in perpetuating certain moral
values. Schools must teach these values, but only in conjunction with
instilling the ability to think critically about the moral appropriateness
of authority.
While Gutmann favors a democratic procedure for choosing
among programs of moral education, there are two limits on the democratic authority that she advocates. The first, nonrepression, prevents society from restricting rational deliberation among competing
conceptions of the good life. The second, nondiscrimination, prohibits
society from excluding educable citizens from adequate education.
Both are essential to conscious social reproduction and both prevent
the majority from implementing educational policies that are
undemocratic.
Throughout the work, Gutmann uses her democratic theory to
consider numerous contemporary educational controversies. For example, in chapter 5 she considers the distribution of primary education and the funding of public schools. Her funding formula calls on
the state to identify schools that provide an adequate education. In
order for demO"cratic education to be adequate, it must do more than
produce functionally literate students who can find employment; it
must also demand from students the ability to think about democratic
politics, and must develop deliberative skills so that future citizens can
effectively participate in conscious social reproduction. Gutmann defines this level of education as the "democratic threshold." Once the
state identifies schools which produce children at the democratic
threshold, it must then increase funding to inadequate schools such
that they can meet this level of education. All funding above the democratic threshold is a matter of democratic discretion. But she also
envisions a nondiscretionary element to funding decisions. Implicit,
but never defended, is the assumption that increased funds will permit
all schools to provide a democratically satisfactory education.
Gutmann considers additional controversies through her democratic analysis including bilingualism (ch. 3), book banning (ch. 4), sex
education and sexist education (ch. 4), the role of private schools (ch.
4), school desegregation (ch. 5), the purpose, funding, and admissions
practices of institutions of higher education (chs. 6 and 7), the educational role and permissibility of government regulation of libraries and
television (ch. 8) and adult education (ch. 9). The theory comfortably
answers many of the vexing, current educational problems. However,
her answers do not always appear consistent with her democratic theory; ultimately they may only justify her own moral preferences.
The incongruity between theory and application may follow from
the fact that while Gutmann proposes a procedure to make educational policy, her procedure is not principle-neutral. The biases of her
theory result from the contention that one of the purposes of educa-
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tion is to instill certain moral attitudes. Evidently these attitudes
should be democratically determined. But while education can be
biased towards values favored by the majority, it should follow from
her theory that the process itself should be morally neutral and should
permit the teaching of any values which are not repressive or discriminatory. The difficulty is that the bases of her democratic analysis are
the "deepest, shared moral commitments" of American society. 8 For
Gutmann these appear to involve adherence to traditional liberal values. 9 Yet she is unable to separate the kind of education her theory
would produce from the values of her theory of educational authority.
Although her theory of decisionmaking should permit a broad range
of outcomes, her values infect the process. In essence Gutmann uses
notions of our "deepest, shared moral commitments" manifested
through the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination to support her own moral preferences.
Her preferences are most noticeable in the case she makes against
the teaching of creationism in public schools. She contends that
schools are prevented by the principle of nonrepression from teaching
creationism even if the subject is favored by a democratic majority.
The principle is violated by the indirect imposition of the religious
views of some on all children in the guise of science (p. 103). She finds
that the indirect "result of establishing religion in public schools
would be to restrict rational deliberation among competing ways of
life" (p. 104). She assumes that religious attitudes are intolerant of
differences and that the idea of creationism cannot be taught without
restricting opposite views. But this does not on its face appear to be
the case. It seems possible at least that creationism could be taught as
an alternative, even if unconvincing, view in addition to the theory of
evolution. Of course, schools would also have to develop the reasoning skills necessary for each child to make a choice, but it does not
follow that the choice is restricted by the introduction of a competing
conception of human origin. Gutmann lets her biases show when she
suggests that schools are bound not "to teach false doctrines that
threaten to undermine the future prospects of a common democratic
education" (p. 103; emphasis added). She thus would prevent the
teaching of a doctrine with which she disagrees on the grounds of
"nonrepression."
Her probable response to this suggestion would demonstrate the
problems discussed above. She states, the case against the teaching of
creationism "rests instead on the claim that secular standards consti8. P. 21. Gutmann looks to "the most commonly held theories concerning educational purposes, authorities and distributions" in order to develop her own theory.
9. Gutmann admits the need to "use some form of philosophical analysis to defend a set of
principles or to determine which set of principles and whose interpretation of them ought to
rule." P. 21.
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tute a better basis upon which to build a common education for citizenship than any set of sectarian religious beliefs - better because
secular standards are both fairer and a firmer basis for peacefully reconciling our differences" (p. 103). Her prohibition of religious instruction is consistent with the admission that her theory rests on principles
drawn from our deeply held common values. America has a long history of the separation of church and state. However, if democratic
authority is limited only by nonrepression and nondiscrimination, it is
difficult to resist a majority decision to teach creationism in the
schools. It appears at least possible to teach creationism in a manner
which does not limit consideration of other views of the good life. If
educational authority truly conformed to the theory Gutmann proposes, it would have to allow creationism in schools if favored by a
majority. But as it appears that deeply held common values can also
trump democratic decisions, how these "values" are defined determines educational content. The problem for Gutmann is that these
values are not set by democratic process.
It is because many will find Gutmann's version of our deeply held
common values intuitively satisfying that Democratic Education will
be most appealing to an American audience. 10 Gutmann's principle of
conscious social reproduction justifies democratic control over educational authority, limited only by the principles of nonrepression and
nondiscrimination. Gutmann would claim that by "conscious social
reproduction" she means the fostering of the ability in future citizens
to deliberate about moral alternatives and arrive at a societal consensus. However, given the extent to which her theory is shaped by current, American, liberal values (which, for her, represent our deeply
held common values), Gutmann underestimates the significance of the
"reproduction" component. Future citizens who have had democratic
educations will favor the reproduction of the society of the previous
generation. Although Gutmann's theory permits the teaching of radical visions of the good life, it appears unlikely to create future citizens
who will desire to implement those visions. While one may not find
10. Indeed, Gutmann finds American federalism particularly well suited to fostering democratic participation in the making of education policy. Local public schools under the control of
elected school boards can respond to the collective preferences of local communities. Such authority permits more effective control, allows content to vary with area preferences, and facilitates citizen participation. At the same time higher levels of government can set limits on local
authority in order to cultivate a common societal culture, teach democratic values, and insure
that local preferences are nonrepressive and nondiscriminatory. Professional authority may be
exercised through the pressure of teacher's unions. Unions can demand conditions under which
teachers are better able to develop democratic character. There is room as well for student participation which itself can foster the participatory virtues of democratic character.
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such a consequence troubling, it is naive to assume that such a result
would be the product of a neutral process.
-

Jonathan Marks

